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1 Introduction 
 
Public pension plans are probably the largest financial transaction systems that we have. In 
OECD countries their expenditure ranges from 5 to 15 percent, and their liabilities, as a rough 
estimate, from 150 to 300 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). For many governments, 
pension payments are the single largest expenditure. National pension plans also represent 
one of the most long-term commitments of governments. The size of these systems is of 
course reflected in their importance to insured citizens. For many, perhaps most, the claim of 
individuals on the public pension system represents their single largest “asset”. 
 
In spite of the economic importance and long-term commitment of these pension plans, their 
financial reporting is essentially medieval. The first problem is that reporting is scarce, and 
that when it exists it is not infrequently of low quality. Here I will deal only with a second 
problem, which is that financial reporting on pay-as-you-go pension plans is based essentially 
on single-entry bookkeeping, statements of cash flows and projections of cash flows. The 
thirteenth-century invention of double-entry bookkeeping
1 which for centuries has been the 
preferred method for accumulating and presenting financial information in virtually all 
organisations but governments, has not been applied to national pay-as-you-go pension plans.  
 
The various cash-flow measurements that are used to show the financial status of public pay-
as-you-go pension schemes do not effectively answer the questions what cause, what effect, 
by what means, and at what rate. Thus, present financial reporting is weak in essential 
information. The single most important measure to enhance expert, public and policymaker 
knowledge of the workings of public pay-as-you-go pension plans would be to introduce 
double-entry bookkeeping for these systems. A plausible assumption is that only what is 
mentioned and measured exists in people’s minds. Thus, such improved reporting and 
knowledge may lead to better policy measures in the future, when present financial 
imbalances will make it necessary to take corrective action. However this second claim is 
much more doubtful than the first. 
 
This paper is a brief introduction to the double-entry bookkeeping system that has been used 
for the essentially pay-as-you-go financed Swedish public pension system since 2001.
2 This 
bookkeeping system was developed for the new pension plan as an intermediate step to ensure 
automatic financial stability. The objective of the indexation of pensions and notional pension 
capital, including the so-called automatic balance mechanism, in this unorthodox public 
pension scheme was to minimise the volatility of the value of the average pension relative to 
the average income for people of working age, while adhering strictly to a fixed contribution 
rate, or payroll tax. Admittedly, the double-entry bookkeeping procedure was an unintentional 
spin-off from the research undertaken to achieve these policy aims. 
 
2  The Swedish Context 
 
The method used to prepare the balance sheet and income statement of the new Swedish 
public pension scheme  the inkomstpension is based on insights gained from the work 
undertaken to ensure its financial stability.
 3 The founders of this unorthodox social insurance 
                                                           
1 Sombart…. 
2 See The Swedish pension System Annual Report 2003, pages 30 – 41 available at 
http://www.rfv.se/english/pdf/arsred03e.pdf or http://www.rfv.se/english/pdf/2500word.pdf for brief descriptions 
of this pension plan. 
3 See the legislative history of the automatic balance mechanism.   4
scheme sought to legislate a pension plan that would guarantee the financing of its obligations 
with a fixed contribution rate – 16% – and the resources available in the buffer fund of the 
system. One reason for this financial firmness was based on social policy. Financial stability 
is a matter of social policy since any imbalance will have to be paid by someone at some time.  
 
In addition, financial sustainability was considered necessary to provide credible protection 
for the scheme against the daily governmental and parliamentary battle over resources. The 
founders were convinced that citizens would benefit if the new Swedish pension plan clearly 
determined who would pay for any financial imbalance, and when this burden would be borne. 
For this reason, they considered it necessary to insulate the old-age pension system from the 
national budget to the maximum extent possible. This separation could only be achieved by 
ensuring that the national budget would not be required to finance deficits in the pension 
system. 
 
These ambitions are hardly astounding – the surprising feature of the Swedish pension reform 
is that they actually completed the long and arduous road to legislation.  
 
Though possessing unusual personal qualities – at least for Swedish politicians – the seven 
members of the pension reform group were not immune to the common temptation of wanting 
to have their cake and eat it, too. Specifically, they sought to establish a pension system that 
was not just financially stable, but also designed to ensure that pensions would develop in line 
with average earnings, i.e. provide a stable replacement rate for different generations. 
Swedish economists, well versed in Samuelson’s (1958) basic text, strongly urged reformers 
to index pensions and the pension liability to the growth of the contribution base, mistakenly 
believing that such indexation would guarantee financial stability. As for the reformers, they 
were concerned not only with financial stability, but also with the “content of the product”, i.e. 
the specific effects on pensions; thus, they advocated indexation of pensions and the pension 
liability according to the development of the average wage, rather than total wages.  
 
The method of managing the conflicting goals of financial stability and a good insurance 
product – here, essentially indexation to the average wage – is perhaps of some general 
interest to scholars or to other countries. The dilemma in this case was “managed” not by a 
compromise, but through a design intended to maximize the likelihood of indexation at a rate 
equal to the growth in average income, with automatic exceptions to this indexation if the 
system would otherwise risk becoming financially insolvent. Weather the system can afford 
to index notional pension accounts and pensions with the growth in average income or not is 
determined by estimating the pay-as-you-go schemes assets and liabilities in a double entry 
bookkeeping system. Prior to the description of this bookkeeping a short discussion on 
conventional measures of actuarial balance in pay-as-you-go pension plans. 
 
3  Conventional measures of actuarial balance in pay-as-you-
go pension plans 
 
For this writer, the most familiar measures of the financial status of public pension schemes 
are the one that was used in Sweden by Riksförsäkringsverket (RFV) prior to 2001
4 and the 
central measure presently used by the US Social Security Agency (SSA). 
 
                                                           
4 In english The National Social Insurance Board.   5
In Sweden RFV was obliged to present an analysis every five years of the financial status of 
the public pension scheme and, in relation to this analysis, to propose a suitable contribution 
rate, or payroll tax. The analysis was presented mainly as a projection of buffer-fund 
development, in terms of fund ratio,
5 assuming a fixed contribution rate and unchanged 
benefit provisions. Normally financial balance, i.e. a buffer fund that never dropped below a 
certain level in a specific scenario, would be secured by proposing an upward adjustment of 
the contribution rate. The range of these projections varied, but prior to 1990 they were never 
for longer than 50 years. 
 
In several respects the financial analysis of the US Social Security system has been more 
advanced and systematic than was the case in Sweden. One reason has perhaps been the 
longer tradition of the large US public pension plan. The US Social Security system was 
introduced in the 1930’s; in Sweden the earnings-related pension plan (ATP) was started in  
1960. The US Social Security Administration (SSA) reports annually on the financial status of 
the Social Security system. In this report, it uses a similar but slightly more sophisticated, or 
dense measure of financial balance than the RFV previously used: a single figure called 
actuarial balance. Briefly, the actuarial balance -- deficit or surplus -- reflects how much the 
contribution rate must be increased (decreased), to ensure that the Social Security buffer fund, 
the trust fund, never drops below a stipulated level in the standard 75-year projection of the 
SSA. 
 
As noted, the main drawback of these measures, aside from all the very difficult issues related 
to the preparation of these projections, is one of presenting the right information. To provide a 
clear picture of the interaction that exists, we would like to know the financial position that 
preceded the one presented. We would also like to know the reasons for the change in the 
preceding period and for each reason the magnitude of its effect on the change. This 
requirement can also be met for the conventional measures used in representing the financial 
position of pay-as-you-go pension systems, and it is indeed fulfilled occasionally for some 
change factors. But such figures do not come from the calculation of the actuarial balance 
measure itself, nor will such ad hoc analysis provide the self-controlling mechanism of 
double-entry bookkeeping. Thus, not even the public pension scheme probably best analysed 
by conventional methods – the US Social Security system – has provided regular information 
on such an interesting and elementary figure to show the cost of the annual change in life 
expectancy. 
 
The double-entry algorithm is the standard, and so far the most efficient, way of 
simultaneously and consistently conveying financial position and changes in it. For this 
reason, double-entry bookkeeping ought to be our prime candidate as a way to improve 
financial reporting on pay-as-you-pension systems. 
 
There are some additional reasons why it probably is better to go the full distance of 
establishing an income statement and balance sheet for national pay-as-you-go pension plans 
rather than trying to provide more measures and analysis along the conventional path. One is 
that the words used in income statements and balance sheets are more familiar to a wider 
circle of policy makers, journalists and informed members of the public than are the terms 
used in standard pay-as-you-go actuarial disclosure. The actuarial balance figure can also be 
criticised as unnecessarily abstract, since it does not explicitly mention liabilities, or assets to 
                                                           
5 The market value of the fund divided by one year of pension disbursements. In Sweden this measure is usually 
referred to as “fund strength”.    6
match them. However, the strength of this argument is questionable; with pay-as-you-go 
financing, the assets that should match liabilities are inherently abstract. 
 
3 Pay-as-you-go  assets? 
 
The idea that the financial position of a pay-as-you-go pension plan can be presented in the 
terms of assets and liabilities does not come naturally, and indeed it may need some getting 
used to. However, to most people it seems clear that a pay-as-you-go system has liabilities, 
both to retired persons and to those who at the time of measurement are working and have 
accrued some pension claim. Opinions differ on the choice of method to estimate the value of 
this liability, but not its existence.
6 
 
It is understandably more controversial to claim that the liabilities of a pay-as-you-go pension 
plan are fully or partially backed by something that we may call “assets”. A defining feature 
of pay-as-you-go financing is that it finances its payments not from pre-funded assets, but 
from current contributions. As a pay-as-you-go system has little or no tangible assets, it may 
be considered, by definition, to be in permanent deficit. While this view seems plausible, it 
may be impractical and perhaps even questionable on theoretical grounds.  
 
For example, in the extremely unlikely event that a pay-as-you-go system with fixed 
contribution rate and benefit rules, contributions continuously and perpetually perfectly match 
pension payments, does this system have a deficit, or is it in financial balance? Reasonably, it 
can be considered to be in financial balance, i.e. have a net present value of zero. If a system 
with a liability of a defined and measurable size has a net present value of zero, it must also 
have assets equal to that liability. As opposed to a premium reserve plan, a pay-as-you-go 
pension plan is free to use contributions to pay off the pension liability, even when the 
contribution directly or indirectly is a source of a new pension liability. Thus, in a pay-as-you-
go pension system, the contribution flow can and should be considered as the principal asset. 
The double-entry bookkeeping of the new Swedish pay-as-you-go pension plan is based on 
this reasoning. The Swedish concept of the value of the contribution flow is expressed in 
English as the contribution asset.
7 
 
It is surprisingly simple to calculate the value of the contribution flow: it is the product of the 
size of the flow per time unit, which in practice is a year, and the expected time between 
payment of contributions and receipt of pensions. The averages are weighted by the age-
dependent amounts of expected contributions and pensions. In Sweden the expected 
contribution-weighted average age of contributors is about 42, and the expected pension-
weighted age of retirees is about 74. Thus, the relevant time span is about 32 (74-42) years, 
and the contribution asset is 32 times one year’s contributions. In the Swedish legislation on 
the automatic balance mechanism, this time span is called omsättningstid – expected turnover 
duration -- as it is a measure of the time required for a cycle of accumulation and depletion of 
the pension liability. Information on the expected turnover duration can be, and is in Sweden, 
annually retrieved from the records of the pension plan. 
 
The contribution asset, that is, contributions times turnover duration, tells us the size of the 
pension liability that would result in a steady state determined by demography, i.e. nativity, 
                                                           
6 The preferred method depends partly on the objective of the liability estimation. 
7 R. Lee, an economic demographer has published considerable work relating to the value of the contribution 
flow in pay-as-you-go financing; Lee uses the term transfer wealth for what in Sweden has been termed the 
contribution asset .   7
age-related net migration and mortality, and the economy of the country, i.e. the size of the 
contribution base and the age-related average incomes, at the time of measurement.
8 The 
turnover duration measures informs, in a single figure, the effect that changes in fertility
9 and 
age-related income patterns and mortality have on the capacity of the contribution flow to 
finance pension liability. 
 
4  Swedish use of an Italian device 
 
The income statement and balance sheet of the inkomstpension plan for the years 2001, 2002 
and 2003 are “reproduced” below. However, to facilitate international comparison, the 
amounts here are expressed in percent of GDP for each year, the appendix gives the original 
amounts in Swedish currency. The income statement consists of 13 genuine entries, of which 
only the four cash-flow statements were disclosed prior to 2001. The balance sheet consists of 
five genuine entries, of which only one – the market value of the buffer fund -- was disclosed 
prior to 2001. For each of the entries, there is a note with detailed information; here the notes 
will not be considered.
10 
 
The income statement is divided into three sections. Section (a) Change in funded assets deals 
with the cash flows of the scheme, i.e. those flows that have changed the value of the buffer 
fund. This section contains no new information relative to what always has been reported. 
Noticeable is the – for a European context – low level of contributions and pension 
disbursements, around 7 percent of GDP. This is explained largely by the fact that the 
inkomstpension deals exclusively with earnings related old-age pensions. Thus disability 
pensions, the guarantee-pension and survivors benefits, which is slowly being phased-out of 
Swedish social security, are not included in the income statement nor in the balance sheet. 
Would those benefits be included expenditure would be around 10 percent of GDP. Presently 
contributions are larger than pension disbursements, a situation that is projected to continue 
up until around year 2010. From that time on pension disbursements are projected to surpass 
contributions, the deficit will be financed with the return on the assets in the buffer fund and 
also, according to projections, part of its capital. The buffer fund is valued at market prices 
the last trading day of the accounting period. As the buffer fund to 60 percent is invested in 
equities the sharp decline in prices on that market has fed into significant buffer fund losses in 
2001 and 2002, losses that were partly regained by a positive development in 2003. 
 
Section (b) Change in contribution assets deals with how much the contribution asset has 
changed due to change in contribution flow (revenue) and due to change in turnover duration 
respectively. As the contribution asset is calculated as the contribution flow (C) times the 
turnover duration (TD) the separation of the effects from changes in two components imply 
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8 For details on turnover duration and the contribution asset, see the legislative history of the automatic balance 
mechanism, Settergren (2001), Settergren and Mikula 2002 and Settergren and Mikula 2003. R. Lee deals 
extensively with the concept. 
9 In the legislation on the Swedish scheme, the effects of fertility changes on turnover duration are disregarded. 
10 The full reports 2001 and 2002 and 2003 report can be downloaded free of charge from 
www.rfv.se/english/publi/index.htm 
11 Trough out this paper the different kinds of smoothing that is done according to the legislation is disregarded, 
for details see the technical appendix of The Swedish Pension System Annual Report 2002.   8
a positive trend in turnover duration, due to the persistent increase in life expectancy, this 
tendency has only been partly offset by the tendency to delay entry into the labour force, due 
to prolonged time spent in education.
12 In a steady state the Value of change in turnover 
duration is zero and Total change in contribution asset assets will grow only as a function of 
the growth in the contribution flow. The contribution flow grows with increases in average 
incomes times the number contributors, essentially the number of gainfully employed.
13 
 
Box 1.  Income statement of the Inkomstpension as a percent of GDP
14 
   2003 2002 2001 
  GDP, millions of SEK (1 Euro ≈9 SEK)  2,440,058 2,347,400 2,266,387 
    
  Change in funded assets (a)   
 Pension  contributions  6.8 6.8 6.9 
 Pension  disbursements  -6.4 -6.5 -6.3 
  Return on funded capital  3.4 3.6 -1.1 
  Costs of administration  -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 
  Total change in funded capital (a)  3.7 -3.3 -0.6 
    
  Change in contribution assets (b)   
New  Value of change in contribution revenue  6.6 9.6 17.9 
New  Value of change in turnover duration   0.5 -0.7 0.7 
  Total change in contribution asset (b)  7.1 8.8 18.6 
    
  Change in pension liability* (c)   
New  New Pension credits and ATP points  -7.1 -7.1 -6.1 
(New)  Pension disbursements  6.4 6.5 6.3 
New  Indexation -9.4 -11.8 -5.1 
New  Value of change in life-expectancy  -0.5 -0.3 -0.8 
New  Inheritance gains arising  0.3 0.3 0.2 
New  Inheritance gains distributed  -0.3 -0.3 0.0 
New  Deduction for costs of administration  0.1 0.1 0.0 
  Total change in pension liability (c)   -10.5 12.6 -5.7 
(New)  Net income/ -loss (a)+(b)+(c)  0.3 -7.1 12.3 
 
Section (c) Change in pension liability informs of the reasons and magnitudes of changes in 
the size of the pension liability. The pension liability: 
−  Increases as new pension credits has been earned during the accounting period. When the 
new pension system has been fully phased in 2018, i.e. when no ATP points any longer 
can be earned, New pension credits will equal Pension contributions. That pension credits 
earned are equal to contributions paid is one criterion for a pension scheme to be defined-
contribution.  
−  Decreases as part of the liability has been paid off as pension disbursements have been 
made. 
                                                           
12 See the special feature article in The Swedish Pension System Annual Report 2002. 
13 In the Swedish scheme the government finances with general tax revenue the contributions for unemployed 
persons, sick persons etc., thus the contribution flow depends on more factors than the number of gainfully 
employed. 
14 Source for the numerators are The Swedish Pension System Annual Report 2001, 2002 and 2003. The GDP 
denominator used are from Konjunkturinstitutets konjunkturrapport, in March 2004. 
*A negative value 
(-) means that the 
pension liability 
increases, and a 
positive value ( ) 
that the pension 
liability decreases, 
by the amount 
shown.   9
−  Increases with the interest paid on the liability, i.e. the indexation. When the new system 
has been fully phased in this interest will by default be equal to the change in average 
income in Sweden. Only if the automatic balance mechanism is activated the indexation 
will deviate from the change in average income. 
−  Increases (decreases) with the Value of changes in life-expectancy. Even in the Swedish 
pension plan, which to my knowledge is the world’s best financially insulated pension 
scheme relative to changes in life expectancy
15 the economic impact from such 
demographic changes are important. The annual increase in pension liability due to 
changes in life-expectancy varies from 0.3 in 2002 to 0.8 percent of GDP in 2001. 
−  Decreases with the Inheritance gains arising that is the value of the pension claims of 
persons that have died before beginning to draw a pension, 
−  Increases with Inheritance gains distributed that is the survivor bonus distributed to those 
non retired and finally the pension liability,  
−  Decreases with the reduction for administrative costs made of the insured’s claim on the 
system. 
 
Box 2.  Balance sheet of the Inkomstpension as a percent of GDP 






  Assets     
  National Pension Funds  23.6 20.8 24.9 
New  Contribution asset  224.0 225.5 224.4 
 Total  assets  247.6 246.2 249.3 
    
  Liabilities and surplus   
New  Opening surplus/-deficit  2.1 9.3 -2.7 
  Net income / -loss for the year  0.3 -7.1 12.3 
New  Total (closing) surplus /-deficit  2.4 2.2 9.6 
New  Pension liability  245.2 244.0 239.7 
  Total liabilities and surplus  247.6 246.2 249.3 
 
The assets of the balance sheet are the market value of the buffer fund and the contribution 
asset, calculated as  t t TD C × . Even though the Swedish national pension plan has one of the 
largest buffer funds of any national pay-as-you-go pension plan it represents less than 10 
percent of the pension liability. 
 
The opening surplus is, naturally, the closing surplus of the preceding accounting period, as 
the GDP denominator changes between the years this important relationship is obscured. The 
opening surplus/-deficit plus the net income/-loss for the year gives the closing surplus for the 
accounting period. The fundamental accounting equality states that: 
Opening balance + net income/loss + (Pension) liability = Total assets. 
 
If one single financial indicator of financial position is sought the natural, most information 
dense, is total assets divided by pension liability. In the translation of the Swedish accounting 
this figure is called balance ratio. If this ratio is less than one (1) the system has a deficit, a 
negative net present value, if it is above one the system has a surplus, a margin. In the 
                                                           
15  Viewed from another angle this efficient insulation can be view as efficiency in passing on the economic 
effects from increases in life expectancy to the insured.    10
Swedish system legislation stipulates that if the balance ratio is below one the balance 
mechanism is triggered.  
 
Box 3.   The balance ratio – Summarising the accounting in one figure 






 Total  assets  247.6 246.2 249.3 
./. Pension  liability  245.2 244.0 239.7 
= Balance  ratio  1.0097 1.0090 1.0400 
 
When the balance mechanism is triggered the indexation of the pensions and pension credits 
will be effectuated by the change in average income adjusted by multiplying the index with 
the balance ratio, starting of a new index series. The balancing of the system means that an 
amount equal to the closing deficit in the balance sheet will be eliminated. If the balance ratio 
after being triggered grows bigger than one the closing balance surplus is automatically 
distributed by increasing the indexation. This continues until the balance index reaches the 
level of the income index. 
 
In some respects the balance ratio resembles the actuarial balance measure that SSA uses, but 
the income statement and balance sheet that comes with the balance ratio, and the notes tied 
to their entries, incorporates details on what cause provokes what effect, by what means, at 
what rate. Thus it is better at supplying the essentials of knowledge. 
 
It is clear that if other administrators of national pension plans were to present their financial 
position the individual entries of their income statements and balance sheets, and the 
associated notes, need to be modified. This to comply with the specific demands of each plan, 
but the general outline should be possible to follow. However the work required in each case 
to be able to present a complete income statement and balance sheet should not be 
underestimated, neither should the rewards from a successful such effort. 
 
A less ambitious endeavour, but a still worth while financial indicator, would be to start to 
annually publish the change, most likely increase, of the pension liability caused by changes 
(increases) in life expectancy.
16 
 
A note on the particular simplicity of the new Swedish pension plan 
 
The double entry bookkeeping of the new Swedish essentially pay-as-you-go financed 
pension plan has been much facilitated by the design of the inkomstpension. Very briefly 
these design features implies that the present value of pension liabilities in the pension 
scheme can be approximated to equal the nominal value of the pension liability. Further the 
nominal value of the pension liability to persons that have not yet started to draw a pension is 
much simpler to calculate in a (notional) defined-contribution pension plan, such as the 
Swedish is, than it is for a traditional defined-benefit plan. The inkomstpension liability to 
persons who have not yet begun to persons still economically active is valued as the aggregate 
of the amounts on each individuals so-called “notional” account. This calculation entails a 
simple aggregation of account balances in RFV registers. The pension liability to retirees is 
also presented at its nominal value. This is done by multiplying pensions granted by the 
expected number of times that the amount will be disbursed. The number of expected 
                                                           
16 If this is done the positive effect on the expected turnover duration from increases in life expectancy should be 
deducted.   11
disbursements is calculated from annual measurements of the length of the time that pension 
amounts in RFV records are paid out. 
 
The nominal valuation of assets and liabilities of the Swedish pension plan imply that all 
valuations are made solely according to what is observable at the time of valuation. For 
example, the normal assumption that contribution revenue increases at the rate of economic 
growth is not explicitly considered in the calculation of the contribution asset. Nor is the 
assumption that pension disbursements, because of factors like indexation, will increase in the 
future considered in the valuation of the pension liability. The main reason why it has been 
deemed reasonable to value assets and liabilities solely according to what can be observed is 
that the financial position of the system is not dependent on the amount of assets and 
liabilities taken separately. The financial position of the system is determined exclusively by 
the relationship between assets and liabilities, in other words, by the so-called balance ratio. 
 
The inkomstpension is designed so that there is a strong link between the development of the 
assets and liabilities of the system. In cases where the balance ration exceeds on (1), however, 
liabilities and assets will develop at somewhat different rates. In cases where the balance 
ration is less than one, the provisions for automatic balancing establish an absolute link 
between the rates of growth in liabilities and assets. Taken as a whole, this means that valuing 
the assets and liabilities of the system solely on the basis of conditions observable at the time 
of valuation entails no risk of overestimating assets in relation to liabilities in the long run.
17 
Together with other design features the provisions for automatic balancing have eliminated 
the need for making explicit assumptions about future economic and demographic 
developments in order to ensure the financial stability of the system. 
 
It is apparent from the above that the method for valuing the assets and liabilities of the 
inkomstpension system is implicitly based on the assumption that assets and liabilities grow at 
the same rate after each valuation. To put it another way, it is assumed in the method of 
valuation that the indexation of the system will always be the same as the internal rate of 
return of the pension liability, even though this outcome is certain only if balancing has been 
activated. When balancing has not been activated, the indexation can be either greater of less 
than the internal rate of return of the pension liability. 
 
5 Does  it  matter? 
 
Will it make any difference if governments continue to furnish us with projected cash flows, 
perhaps boiled down to a figure reflecting “actuarial balance” as done in the US, or if they 
would start to present income statements and balance sheets and summarise them in a 
“balance ratio”? I believe it would make a difference. A “normalised”, double entry, way of 
reporting on financial position of national pension plans provides more detailed information – 
presented in a more comprehensible way – to both policy makers and the insured than do 
discounted cash flows. And the balance ratio is, in my opinion, a better summary of the 
financial situation in a pay-a-s-you-go pension plan. Such improved information has the 
potential to promote better policies when it comes to stabilise the finances of national pension 
plans.  
                                                           
17 The manner of calculating turnover duration involves an implicit assumption that the population growth is 
zero. Thus, turnover duration will be (slightly) over estimated in cases where the working-age population is 
decreasing. This entails a risk that the calculations will (slightly) overestimate the system’s assets in relation to 
its liabilities. However, it is reasonable to assume that the population decline will cease at some point. If so, the 
deficit will be temporary.   12
   13




Applying double entry bookkeeping might also promote a debate on to what extent the 
financial stability of national pay-as-you-go pension schemes ought to rely on future 
development of the demographic and economic factors that in a defined benefit plan decide 
the plans financial development. And to what extent their financial stability should be less 
dependent of such demographic and economic factors by transferring risks and opportunities 
to the pension benefit-level, as is done in a defined-contribution plan. The inkomstpension is 
radical in that it transfers all demographic and economic risks to the insured. This has made 
the accounting simpler than it will be in systems that instead, implicitly or explicitly places 
the risks on the contribution rate, or splits the risk between contribution rate and pension 
level.
19 In defined benefit pension plans the accounting will need explicit assumptions of the 
future. Doing this contains risks and opportunities – illustrated in figure 1 – that the 
accounting provisions for the Swedish pension keep away from. 
                                                           
18 The essentials of this image came out of a discussion with Boguslaw D. Mikula at RFV. 
19 The risks that the insured are exposed to is reduced by the existence of the so-called guaranteed pension. This  
benefit is financed by general tax revenue, not contributions to the inkomstpension system. In a sense, the 
guarantee pension can be considered to have the effect of splitting the risk between contributors/tax payers and 
retirees, however retirees with (relatively) low pension benefits are beneficiaries of this tax financed insurance. 
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Line of satisfied expectations  14
Appendix: Income statement and balance sheet of the inkomstpension 
 
Income statement, millions of SEK
20 
 2003 2002 2001
Change in funded assets (a) 
Pension contributions  165,107 160,745 156,811
Pension disbursements  -155,410 -151,757 -143,564
Return on funded capital  82,060 -84,529 -25,035
Costs of administration  -2,359 -2,081 -1,943
Total change in funded capital (a)  89,398 -77,622 -13,731
 
Change in contribution assets (b) 
Value of change in contribution revenue  159,964 224,275 405,877
Value of change in turnover duration   12,346 -16,763 15,745
Total change in contribution asset (b)  172,310 207,512 421,622
 
Change in pension liability (c) 
New Pension credits and ATP points  -172,567 -167,585 -138,627
Pension disbursements  155,410 151,562 143,564
Indexation -228,288 -275,946 -116,287
Value of change in life-expectancy  -11,045 -5,923 -18,728
Inheritance gains arising  7,090 6,389 5,476
Inheritance gains distributed  -7,616 -6,617 -5,490
Deduction for costs of administration  1,475 1,478 923
Total change in pension liability (c)   -255,541 -296,642 -129,169
 
Net income/ -loss (a)+(b)+(c) 6,167 -166,752 278,722
 
Balance sheet, millions of SEK 
  Dec. 31 2003 Dec. 31 2002 Dec. 31 2001
Assets      
National Pension Funds  576,937 487,539 565,171
Contribution asset  5,465,074 5,292,764 5,085,252
Total assets  5,780,303 5,650,423
 
Liabilities and surplus 
Opening surplus/-deficit  51,645 218,397 -60,315
Net income / -loss for the year  6,167 -166,752 278,722
Total (closing) surplus /-deficit  57,812 51,645 218,407
Pension liability  5,984,199 5,728,658 5,432,016
Total liabilities and surplus  6,042,011 5,780,303 5,650,423
 
                                                           
20 Source The Swedish Pension System Annual Report 2001, 2002 and 2003.    15
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